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Abstract We consider supplier development within a
supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a
single supplier. Because investments in supplier develop-
ment are usually relationship-specific, safeguard mecha-
nisms against the hazards of partner opportunism have to
be installed. Here, formal contracts are considered as the
primary measure to safeguard investments. However, for-
mal contracts entail certain risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility,
particular in an ambiguous environment. We propose a
receding horizon control scheme to mitigate possible con-
tractual drawbacks while significantly enhancing the sup-
plier development process and, thus, to increase the overall
supply chain profit. Our findings are validated by a
numerical case study.
Keywords Supply chain management  Supplier
development  Optimal control  Receding horizon
scheme  Dynamic systems
1 Introduction
Since manufacturing firms increasingly focus on their core
business activities, an efficient supply chain plays a major
role in generating competitive advantages. However, sup-
pliers too often lack the capability to perform adequately.
In response, manufacturers across a wide range of indus-
tries are implementing supplier development programmes
to improve supply chain performance [48]. According to
[22, p. 206], supplier development is defined as any effort
by a buying firm to improve a supplier’s performance and/
or capabilities to meet the manufacturing firm’s short- and/
or long-term supply needs.
In accordance with the relational view as proposed
by [10], activities of supplier development, in which firms
convert general-purpose resources such as money, people
skills, or managerial knowledge into relationship-specific
resources, represent a rent-generating process. However,
relationship-specific resources are difficult or even impos-
sible to redeploy outside the particular business relation-
ship [54]. Thus, firms may see resources committed to
supplier development as vulnerable to opportunistic expro-
priation [51]. Following this line of reasoning, supplier
development activities with high levels of asset specificity
should be safeguarded against the hazards of partner
opportunism [27]. Here, contracts in terms of formalized,
legally binding agreements that explicitly specify the
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obligations of each firm, are usually viewed as the primary
means of safeguarding, particularly in a dynamically
evolving environment [2, 7]. The drawback of long-term
contracts is, as the degree of uncertainty increases, both
specifying ex ante all possible contingencies and verifying
ex post the performance of the business partner becomes
increasingly difficult [54]. Therefore, firms might be reluc-
tant to sign long-term contracts, which potentially dimin-
ishes the firms’ propensity to invest in supplier development
activities and thus impedes the manufacturer’s initial strat-
egy to enhance supply chain performance [37].
Given this background, the purpose of our research is to
analyse the impact of dynamically extending a contract to
mitigate possible contractual hazards. In addition, we seek to
answer the following questions: How does the contract
period, i.e., planning horizon, affect firms’ willingness to
commit relationship-specific resources to supplier develop-
ment? Does receding horizon control offer a straightforward
method for dynamically extending the planning horizon,
while simultaneously facilitating value generation within
supplier development? Further, how should receding hori-
zon control be arranged to optimize supply chain profit?
By answering these questions, the contribution of our
paper is threefold. Firstly, we formulate a continuous-time
optimal control problem characterizing the supplier devel-
opment investment decision. We conduct a detailed study,
showing that the incentives for firms to participate in supplier
development critically depend on the contract period. Sec-
ondly, given the fact that long-term contracts entail certain
risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility, we utilize receding horizon
control and show that the supplier development process can
be enhanced by dynamically extending the contract, see [43]
for the basic idea of prediction-based control. Based on this
result, a one-to-one map is derived linking the contract per-
iod to the optimal level of supplier development (collabo-
ration). The insight gained from these considerations allows
to either increase the supply chain efficiency or realize the
same level of collaboration while being obliged to a shorter
contract period. Finally, we present a simple strategy slightly
modifying the proposed receding horizon control scheme in
order to avoid pathological behaviour of the supply chain.
This allows to realize the optimal level of collaborationwhile
avoiding unnecessary transaction costs. The remainder of
this paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the related liter-
ature is briefly reviewed in Sect. 2. Then, in Sect. 3 the basic
optimal control problem is described. In the subsequent
Sect. 4, the dependence of the control policy on the contract
period is studied in detail. In Sect. 5, a receding horizon
scheme is proposed and analysed before the effectiveness of
the developed methodology is demonstrated by means of a
numerical case study in Sect. 6 before conclusions are
drawn.
2 Related literature
The topic of supplier development has received consider-
able attention from researchers in the past two decades.
Previous research has provided good insights into the use
of certain activities [47], the antecedents [22], critical
success factors [27, 49], and the prevalence of supplier
development in practice [24, 41].
Supplier development has been applied in various fields
of application [44]. Within the automotive industry, Toy-
ota initially began providing on-site assistance to help
suppliers implement the Toyota Production System [39].
Other manufacturers have followed this collaborative
approach to develop suppliers’ performance and/or capa-
bilities, including Boeing, Chrysler, Daimler, Dell, Ford,
General Motors, Honda, Nissan, Siemens, and Volkswagen
[34, 38]. Typically, manufacturing firms use a variety of
supplier development activities, e.g., providing perfor-
mance feedback, training suppliers’ personnel, furnishing
temporary on-site support to enhance further interaction,
providing equipment and tools, or even dedicating capital
resources to suppliers [47, 50].
Empirical studies support that supplier development is a
key factor to attenuate inefficiencies within the supply
chain and, thus, strategically contributes to strengthen the
manufacturer’s competitiveness [28, 40]. Benefits resulting
from supplier development include, e.g., improvements in
cost efficiency, product quality and/or lead time [17, 25].
However, [23] note that firms’ success in supplier devel-
opment varies. In particular, relationship-specific invest-
ments lead, in general, to a more satisfactory outcome.
Further, [22] shows that the firms’ propensity to participate
in supplier development activities is higher if a continua-
tion of the relationship is expected. Here, [49] adds that
supplier development is more effective in mature as
opposed to initial phases of relationship life cycles.
According to [10], appropriate safeguard mechanisms
may influence both transaction costs and the willingness of
firms to commit relationship-specific resources to supplier
development, a condition that could be an important source
of competitive advantage. In the first case, firms achieve an
advantage by incurring lower transaction costs to realize a
given level of supplier development specificity. In the
second case, firms create relational rents by attaining a
higher level of asset specificity [9, 46]. Following this line
of reasoning, the firms’ ability to align a considerable level
of relationship-specific investments with an appropriate
safeguard mechanism could enhance efficiency and effec-
tiveness of supplier development activities and thereby
should be critical to the success of supplier development.
Scholars usually distinguish between two classes of
governance mechanism: the first relies on third-party
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enforcement of agreements, e.g., legal contracts, whereas
the second relies on self-enforcing agreements, e.g., rela-
tional norms, that make long-term gains from the ongoing
relationship exceed potential short-term payoffs from act-
ing opportunistically [8, 45]. Here, it has been suggested
that self-enforcing agreements are a less costly and more
effective means of safeguarding relationship-specific
investments in comparison with formal contracts [1, 35].
Despite the significant methodological and theoretical
contributions of these streams of research, empirical evi-
dence shows that formal contracts are still viewed as the
primary means of safeguarding against the hazards of
partner opportunism, particular in an ambiguous environ-
ment [2, 7]. However, contract research is moving away
from a narrow focus on contract structure and its safe-
guarding function towards a broader focus that also
highlights adaptation and coordination as shown in [42].
In [53] it is even suggested that contracts function as
relationship management tools.
Nevertheless, the application of formal decision-making
models proposed for assisting firms in contract negotiations
in order to adequately safeguard relationship-specific
investments has received limited attention in the supplier
development literature [3]. Without understanding the
impact of the contract period on the firms’ incentives to
commit relationship-specific resources to supplier devel-
opment, its return will be negligible, perhaps even leading
to the premature discontinuation of such collaborative cost-
reduction efforts.
The trend to utilize mathematical models in general and
control theory in particular in decision-making within
supply chains is clearly visible [18] and [16]. Here, model
predictive control (MPC), also termed receding (rolling)
horizon control, plays a predominant role due to its ability
to deal with nonlinear constrained multi-input multi-output
systems on the one hand, see, e.g., [6, 14], and its inherent
robustness on the other hand, see [31, 32, 57] for details.
Consequently, MPC is a well-established strategy to deal
with uncertainties in supply chains, see, e.g., [33, 52] and
[19]. In this paper, MPC is first used in supplier develop-
ment to mitigate possible contractual hazards by dynamical
extending the contract, see also our preliminary study [55].
3 Model description
We consider a particular supply chain consisting of a single
manufacturer M and a single supplier S, in which M
assembles components from S and sells the final product to
the market. We restrict ourselves to the linear price dis-
tribution curve pðdÞ ¼ a bd, which establishes a con-
nection between the production quantity d and the sale
price p, in order to streamline the upcoming analysis. Here,
the coefficients a[ 0 and b[ 0 denote the prohibitive
price and the price elasticity of the commodity, respec-
tively. This market condition is comparable with an
oligopolistic or monopolistic market structure, in which a
firm can increase market demand by lowering the sale
price. Similar approaches to specify the price distribution
curve have been proposed by [4, 20, 27].
3.1 Basic model
It is supposed that the decision-making process is struc-
tured such that M determines the quantity supplied to the
market obeying the paradigm of profit maximization. Note
that we do not distinguish market demand from the pro-
duction quantity of the manufacturer because the market
price is endogenous to the quantity sold. Moreover, the
supplier produces the components to satisfy the demand d
and thus does not decide on the production quantity.
Because the manufacturer’s goal is profit maximization, the
production quantity d chosen by M is determined by
differentiating
d  ðpðdÞ  cM  cSCÞ ð1Þ
with respect to d and setting the resulting expression equal
to zero, i.e.,
pðdÞ  cM  cSC  bd¼! 0; ð2Þ
which yields the optimum production quantity dH ¼
acMcSC
2b
and the optimal sale price pðdHÞ ¼ aþcMþcSC
2
.
Here, cM and cSC denote the manufacturer’s unit produc-
tion costs and the supply costs per unit charged by S,
respectively. We further assume that the supplier wants to
earn a fixed profit margin r. Thus, the supply costs cSC
consist of the supplier’s fixed profit margin r and the
supplier’s unit production costs cS, i.e., cSC ¼ r þ cS. This
assumption is not completely new: Honda Motor Com-
pany, e.g., first learns extensively about a suppliers cost
structure and then specifies a target price that combines
both the suppliers unit production cost and a percent
margin [29]. Similar approaches to specify the supply costs
have been proposed by [4, 21, 27]. Summing up, the supply
chain profit is given by
J ¼ JM þ JS ¼ ða cM  cSCÞ
2
4b
þ a cM  ðr þ cSÞ
2b
r
¼ ða cM  cSÞ
2  r2
4b
:
It is supposed that the manufacturer wants to decrease the
supplier’s unit production costs cS by conducting supplier
development projects to increase the market share if that
increases the overall profit of the supply chain. To this end,
the sustainable effect of supplier development on the
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supplier’s unit production costs cS is modelled by
cSðxÞ ¼ c0xm,1 where c0[ 0 denotes the supplier’s unit
production cost at the outset, m\0 characterizes the sup-
plier’s learning rate, and x defines the cumulative number
of realized supplier development projects. The latter is
modelled as a time-dependent function x : ½0; T  ! R 0
governed by the ordinary differential equation
_xðtÞ :¼ d
dt
xðtÞ ¼ uðtÞ; xð0Þ ¼ x0 ¼ 1; ð3Þ
with u 2 L1ðR 0; ½0;xÞ. Here, u(t) describes the number
of supplier development projects at time t; with capacity
bound x[ 0 to reflect limited availability of resources in
terms of time, manpower, or budget. Similar models of cost
reduction through learning have been proposed by
[4, 11, 20, 27, 56].
The costs of supplier development are integrated into the
proposed model by a penalization term cSDuðtÞ, cSD 0.
Overall, this yields the supply chain’s profit function
JSC : u 7! R
JTðu; x0Þ :¼
Z T
0
ða cM  c0xðtÞmÞ2  r2
4b
 cSDuðtÞdt
ð4Þ
for a given time interval [0, T], which must be maximized
subject to the control constraints 0 uðtÞx, t 2 ½0;TÞ,
and the system dynamics (3). The contract period T is of
particular interest since investments into the cost structure
of the supply chain require their amortization during the
runtime of the contractual agreement. A summary of the
parameters is given in Table 1.
3.2 Solution of the optimal control problem
Pontryagin’s maximum principle, see, e.g., [26], is used
analogously to [20] to solve the optimal control problem
introduced in the preceding subsection. To formulate the
necessary optimality conditions, we require the so-called
Hamiltonian H, which is defined as
Hðx; u; kÞ :¼ ða cM  c0x
mÞ2  r2
4b
 cSDuþ ku: ð5Þ
From the necessary conditions, we obtain the system
dynamics
_xHðtÞ ¼ HkðxHðtÞ; uHðtÞ; kðtÞÞ ¼ uHðtÞ;
the so-called adjoint k : ½0; T ! R, which is characterized
by
_kðtÞ ¼ HxðxHðtÞ; uHðtÞ; kðtÞÞ ¼ mc0x
HðtÞm1ða cM  c0xHðtÞmÞ
2b
;
ð6Þ
and the transversality condition
kðTÞ ¼ 0: ð7Þ
The solution uH : ½0; TÞ ! ½0;x of the optimal control
problem exhibits the structural property
uHðtÞ :¼ x if t\t
H
0 if t tH
(
ð8Þ
depending on the (optimal) switching time tH 2 ½0; T,
which is characterized by the equation
mc0ðx0 þ xtHÞm1ða cM  c0ðx0 þ xtHÞmÞ
2b
¼ cSDðtH  TÞ :
ð9Þ
In the following, (9) is called switching condition. Indeed,
since the cost function is (strictly) convex and the system
dynamics are governed by a linear ordinary differential
equation, it can be shown that this condition is necessary
and sufficient for the considered problem, see [36] for a
detailed derivation. We emphasize that the switching
time tH characterizes the optimal time of collaboration
since every investment in supplier development up to tH
results in an increased profit while expenditures spent
after tH do not amortize during the contract period and are,
thus, not economically reasonable within the considered
setting.
The optimal value function VTðx0Þ of the problem under
consideration reads
VTðx0Þ :¼ sup
u2L1ð½0;TÞ;½0;xÞ
JSCT ðu; x0Þ
Table 1 List of parameter
Symbol Description Value
T Contract period 60
a Prohibitive price 200
b Price elasticity 0.01
cM Variable cost per unit (M) 70
c0 Variable cost per unit (S) 100
r Fixed profit margin (S) 15
cSD Supplier development cost per unit 100,000
x Resource availability 1
m Learning rate 0:1
1 Because supplier development is most often used as of the end of
the growth stage as opposed to initial stages of a product’s life cycle,
we consider solely the learning that occurs through the cumulative
number of realized supplier development projects without considering
further effects, e.g., total number of units produced [5, 30].
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where the expression on the right-hand side is maximized
subject to _xðtÞ ¼ uðtÞ, xð0Þ ¼ x0. VT : R[ 0 ! R maps the
initial value x0 to the optimal value. The index T indicates
the contract period and can be considered as a parameter—
an interpretation, which is crucial for the upcoming
analysis.
Evidently, investments (in the cost structure) pay off in
the long run: while all the effort is spent directly at the
beginning of the collaboration, the resulting cost decreas-
ing effect is exploited during the remainder of the contract
period.
Remark 1 At the switching time tH, the marginal revenue
of further investments in supplier development (given by
the adjoint variable k) equals the marginal costs (given by
cSD) as indicated in Fig. 1. This reasoning is expressed by
the switching condition (9).
4 Interplay of switching time and contract period
If the desired contract between manufacturer M and sup-
plier S ranges over the interval [0, T], two cases can be
distinguished:
1. The (optimal) switching time is given by tH ¼ 0
meaning that investments in supplier development do
not pay off during the contract period.
2. A switching time tH[ 0 represents the scenario where
investing into supplier development amortizes during
the contract period.
After determining the outcome of a potential collaboration
over the interval [0, T], the overall market situation has to
be taken into account, e.g., does it make (more) sense to
cooperate with a different supplier instead of adhere to the
already existing business relation, see, e.g., [12] and [36]
for the considered setting with multiple suppliers. Here,
however, it is supposed that continuation of the collabo-
ration is preferable since our focus is on the arrangement of
the manufacturer/supplier cooperation. Hence, Option 1
corresponds to the scenario, in which supplier development
cannot increase profitability within the supply chain and
the cooperation with another supplier acting on the market
is also not economically reasonable. Hence, we focus on
the second case within this paper.
Here, from the specific structure (8) of the optimal
control function we can conclude that all investments up to
time tH pay off during the contract period. Then, taking
into account the already reduced supply costs given by
cSCðtÞ ¼ r þ c0xðtHÞm with
c0xðtHÞm ¼ c0 x0 þ
Z tH
0
uHðsÞdt
 !m
¼ c0ð1þ xtHÞm;
further effort in terms of uðtÞ[ 0, t 2 ½tH; TÞ, does not lead
to an increased profit. The latter holds true since cost-re-
duction efforts after tH do not amortize within the
remaining time interval of at most length T  tH and are,
thus, not economically reasonable. We show that a pro-
longation of the contract period yields an augmentation of
the investments in supplier development, which corre-
sponds to an increased switching time tH. A proof of
Lemma 1 is given in ‘‘Appendix 8’’.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the contract period T is chosen
(long enough) such that tH ¼ tHðTÞ[ 0 holds. In addition,
let the condition
ð1 mÞða cM  c0Þ þ c0m 0 ð10Þ
hold. Then prolonging the contract period T , T[ T , im-
plies a strictly larger switching time tH ¼ tHðTÞ,
i.e., tHðTÞ[ tHðTÞ.
Remark 2 The assumptions of Lemma 1 imply the
inequality a cM  c0  r[ 0 as a by-product because the
manufacturer cannot realize a profit per unit sold otherwise
(prohibitive price is greater than the production cost per
unit at time t ¼ 0 from the manufacturer’s point of view).
Hence, the seemingly technical Condition (10) links the
supplier’s production costs c0 with the difference of profit
per unit a cM  c0 by the learning rate m. Note that the
assumptions of Lemma 1 can be easily verified for a given
dataset of parameters.
Lemma 1 shows that investments in supplier develop-
ment are extended if the contract period is prolonged.
Hence, the collaboration continues after the previously
determined switching time tH. As a result, the supplier’s
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Fig. 1 The adjoint k : ½0; T  ! R 0 computed based on the param-
eters given in Table 1
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unit production costs are further decreased, the quantity
offered is increased and the supply chain profit per time
unit grows. The argument that a longer contract period
leads to larger switching times can also be validated
numerically as visualized in Fig. 2. Here, we observe that
the supply costs cSCðtÞ ¼ r þ c0xðtÞm are further reduced
if both the manufacturer and the supplier agree on a
longer contract period. The relation between the contract
period T and the optimal switching time tHðTÞ is almost
linear.2
In summary and according to the initial question how
does the contract period, i.e., planning horizon, affect
firms’ willingness to commit relationship-specific resources
to supplier development, the findings show that the supply
chain partners’ incentives to commit relationship-specific
resources, i.e., to invest in cost-reduction efforts, critically
depend on the length of the contract period.
5 Successive prolongation of the contract period
The benefits of an increased switching time come along
with the inflexibility resulting from long-term contracts. In
this section, we propose a methodology for assisting supply
chain partners in contract negotiations to achieve the
benefits of long-term contracts while committing them-
selves only to agreements of a certain, prespecified (col-
laboration) time period. To this end, it is assumed that the
manufacturer and the supplier are only content to make
contracts of length T. If the collaboration is successful for a
certain amount of time ½0;DTÞ, DT  tH, they might agree
to renew the contract on the time interval ½DT ; T þ DT .
Before we continue the discussion, let us briefly sketch
the computation of the (optimal) control func-
tion uH : ½DT ; T þ DTÞ ! ½0;x. Here, the profit function
has to be maximized based on the new (initial) state xðDTÞ,
i.e., JSCT ð; xðDTÞÞ is considered. Since DT  tH holds by
assumption, the new initial state xðDTÞ is given by
xðDTÞ ¼ xð0Þ þ
Z DT
0
uHðsÞdt ¼ x0 þ DT  x ð11Þ
in view of Property (8). Hence, the profit on the new
contract period ½DT; T þ DT  is determined by maximizing
JTðu; xðDTÞÞ ¼
Z T
0
ða cM  c0~xðtÞmÞ2  r2
4b
 cSDuðtÞdt
subject to uðtÞ 2 ½0;x, t 2 ½0; TÞ and the differential
equation (3) with initial condition ~xð0Þ ¼ xðDTÞ ¼
x0 þ xDT . Here, we used the notation ~x to distinguish the
previously computed (state) trajectory xð; x0Þ and its
counterpart ~xð; xðDTÞÞ depending on the new initial con-
dition xðDTÞ. Another option is to use the time invariance
of the linear differential equation _xðtÞ ¼ uðtÞ, which allows
to rewrite the profit functional as
Z TþDT
DT
ða cM  c0xðtÞmÞ2  r2
4b
 cSDuðtÞdt
with initial value xðDTÞ given by (11) at initial time DT .
We point out that the resulting trajectory deviates from the
previously computed one already before time T. In con-
clusion, the implemented control strategy on ½0; T þ DTÞ is
given by
uðtÞ :¼ u
HðtÞ maximizing JSCT ð; x0Þ t 2 ½0;DTÞ
uHðtÞ maximizing JSCT ð; xðDTÞÞ tDT
(
;
ð12Þ
i.e., the first piece of the old policy concatenated with the
newly negotiated strategy. This strategy yields an optimal
policy on the time span ½0; T þ DTÞ. Hence, the same
overall supply chain profit is reached without the hazards
of being committed already at the beginning (time 0) as
shown in the following corollary.
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Fig. 2 Optimal switching
time tH ¼ tHðTÞ in dependence
of the length of the contract T ¼
T þ i  DT (T ¼ 60, DT ¼ 3 and
i ¼ 0; 1; . . .; 7)
2 Indeed, the slope of the curve is slightly increasing.
14 Page 6 of 12 Logist. Res. (2016) 9:14
123
Corollary 1 Let the optimal switching time tH deter-
mined by Condition (9) be strictly greater than zero. Fur-
thermore, let DT , DT\tH, be given. Then, the control
strategy defined in (12) and the corresponding supply
chain profit on ½0; T þ DT equal their counterparts
obtained by maximizing JTþDTðu; x0Þ with respect
to u : ½0; T þ DTÞ ! ½0;x
Proof Since the profit JTþDTðu; x0Þ on the considered
time interval ½0; T þ DT with u from (12) is the sum of
Z DT
0
ða cM  c0xðtÞmÞ2  r2
4b
 cSDx dt
and
þ
Z TþDT
DT
ða cM  c0xðtÞmÞ2  r2
4b
 cSDuðtÞdt;
the dynamic programming principle yields the equality
JTþDTðu; x0Þ ¼ VTþDTðx0Þ;
which completes the proof. h
5.1 Receding horizon control
The idea of an iterative prolongation of collaboration
contracts can be algorithmically formalized as receding
horizon control (RHC) also known as model predictive
control.
Upon start, the manufacturer M and the supplier S agree
on a collaboration for a given contract period of length
T. Firstly, the status quo—represented by x^—is analysed.
Secondly, the optimal switching time tH is computed based
on the initial state x^ and T, cf. Step (2). This yields the
optimal control strategy defined by (13), of which the first
piece uHj½0;DTÞ is applied. Then, the manufacturer and the
supplier meet again at time t þ DT to negotiate a new
contract. This initiates the process again, i.e.. the
previously described steps are repeated, which is referred
to as receding horizon principle. Note that since the
underlying system dynamics are time invariant, the newly
(measured) initial state x^ represents all information
required. In particular, no knowledge regarding the previ-
ously applied control is needed to solve the adapted
switching condition of Step (2) with respect to tH. Figure 3
illustrates the outcome of Algorithm 1 with prediction
horizon T ¼ 60 (contract period) and control hori-
zon DT ¼ 3 (time step) based on the parameters given in
Table 1.
Firstly (t ¼ 0), the original optimal control problem is
solved resulting in tH  9:21. Then, uH  x is applied on
the time interval ½0;DTÞ. Secondly (t ¼ DT), the collabo-
ration is prolonged to tH  9:74. Thirdly (t ¼ 2DT), the
switching time is shifted to tH  10:27. Still, t ¼ 3DT  tH
holds. Hence, the (measured) initial state x^ is given by
x0 þ tx ¼ x0 þ 3DTx. Here, Step (2) of Algorithm (1)
yields tH  10:79, i.e., the collaboration stops within the
time frame ½t; t þ DTÞ. If the RHC scheme is further
0 3 6 9 12 15
0
3
6
9
12
15
Planed collaboration interval
T
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e
t
Fig. 3 Application of Algorithm 1 to compute the optimal switching
times for T ¼ 60 and changing initial conditions x^. The lengths of the
collaboration intervals are decreasing
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applied, there occur collaboration intervals of shrinking
length.
As already discussed in Sect. 5, if the contract is not
renewed, uHðtÞ is set to zero for t tH  9:21. In contrast
to that, the RHC scheme prolongs the collaboration and,
thus, increases the supply chain profit. To be more precise,
the profit generated by Algorithm 1 on ½0; T þ iDT,
i 2 f0; 1; 2; . . .; T=DTg,
XT=DTþi1
k¼0
Z ðkþ1ÞDT
kDT
ða cM  c0xðtÞmÞ2  r2
4b
 cSDuðtÞdt
is greater than its counterpart JTðuH; x0Þ þ ViDTðxHðTÞÞ
consisting of the maximum of the original cost func-
tion VTðx0Þ ¼ JTðuH; x0Þ and a second (optimally oper-
ated) contract on ½T ; T þ iDT  based on the reached cost
structure represented by xHðTÞ ¼ x0 þ tHx  x0þ
9:21x ¼ 10:21. In particular, this assertion holds in com-
parison with simply sticking to the cost structure based on
tHðTÞ, i.e.,
JTðuH; x0Þ þ
Z TþiDT
T
ða cM  c0xðtHðTÞÞmÞ2  r2
4b
dt:
ð14Þ
While an increased switching time tH may already
increase the profitability within a supply chain during the
considered time span, the achieved cost reduction sus-
tains. Hence, if the collaboration between the manufac-
turer and the supplier lasts, the obtained effect is a
sustainable one.
In summary and referring to the question how does
receding horizon control offer a straightforward method
for dynamically extending the planning horizon, the find-
ings show that dynamically extending contracts enhance
the supplier development process, because value genera-
tion is facilitated while both the manufacturer and the
supplier gain flexibility due to shorter contract periods.
5.2 Optimal point of collaboration
As observed in Fig. 3, the collaboration can stop within the
time interval ½t; t þ DTÞ meaning that the prerequi-
site DT  tH is no longer satisfied at time t. This leads to a
sequence of collaboration times of shrinking length.
Summing up all of these intervals on the infinite horizon
yields a total collaboration time of approximately 11.18
time units. Hence, the total collaboration time is increased
by 21.3 %. However, since the collaboration intervals are
becoming comparably short, implementing this strategy
may be impracticable. Here, we propose two remedies: If
the new collaboration period at time t ¼ kDT , i.e., tH  t,
is below a certain threshold value,
1. set tH ¼ t in order to save negotiation costs, which
would probably outweigh the achievable earning
growth. For the presented example, the supplier
development programme stops at 10.79 (still an
increase of approximately 17.2 %) if the threshold is 1.
2. measure the current state x^ ¼ xðtÞ and compute the
optimal cost structure for contract periods of length T
by solving
mc0Tx
m1ða cM  c0xmÞ þ 2bcSD ¼ 0
with respect to x. Then, set tH ¼ t þ ðx x^Þ=x. In the
considered example at time t ¼ 4DT , the measured
state is x^ ¼ 10:79 while x  11:18. Hence, a collabo-
ration of length 0.39 time units is fixed. At all
upcoming time instants, tH ¼ t holds because the
optimal cost structure for contract periods of
length T ¼ 60 is already reached.
Clearly, the threshold should be chosen such that the profit
increase outweighs the negotiation costs.
Thus, Algorithm 1 allows both the manufacturer and the
supplier to prolong their supplier development programme
without binding themselves for a time span longer
than T and, thus, provides more flexibility.
Remark 3 Algorithm 1 is a simplified version. Indeed, the
time step DT may vary in time, e.g., longer time steps in
the beginning (for example, DT ¼ tH in the considered
setting), and shorter ones later on. For details on the so-
called time-varying control horizon, we refer to [15].
In summary and with regard to the question how should
receding horizon control be arranged to optimize supply
chain profit, two strategies are presented in order to make
the proposed receding horizon scheme, cf. Algorithm 1,
applicable even if negotiation costs are taken into account.
6 Numerical results
As seen in the previous section, applying the receding
horizon Algorithm 1 dynamically extends the collaboration
within the supply chain and, thus, generates additional
profit within the supply chain. Next, we conduct a
numerical case study to obtain further managerial insights.
To this end, we compare the outcome JHH of the pro-
posed algorithm based on the second option presented in
Sect. 5.2 and the supply chain profit resulting from the
control
uðtÞ ¼ x for t\t
HðTÞ
0 for t tHðTÞ
(
ð15Þ
on the time interval ½0; 2T  ¼ ½0; 120. The control pol-
icy (15) results from the basic optimal control problem
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considered on [0, 60] and, then, utilizing the achieved cost
structure cSCðtÞ ¼ x0 þ tHx on [60, 120] without further
investments in supplier development. The corresponding
profit is given by (14).
To fully understand the impact of receding horizon
control on the supply chain profit in depth, we first vary the
following parameters of Table 1
a 2 f192:5; 195; 197:5; 200; 202:5; 205; 207:5g;
b 2 f0:007; 0:008; 0:009; 0:01; 0:011; 0:012; 0:013g;
cSD 2 f70000; 80000; 90000; 100000; 110000; 120000; 130000g;
x 2 f0:7; 0:8; 0:9; 1; 1:1; 1:2; 1:3g;
m 2 f0:13;0:12;0:11;0:1;0:09;0:08;0:07g
resulting in a total number of 75 = 16,807 instances. For
each parameter combination, we then evaluate the respec-
tive profits.
The depicted histogram in Fig. 4 shows the absolute
frequency with which a percentage of profit increase is
observed within our parameter set. The mean value
is 3.36 % with a standard deviation of 1.06 %. In conclu-
sion, receding horizon control significantly improves the
profitability of the considered supply chain.
Second, we are interested in the interplay of the sup-
plier’s learning rate m and receding horizon control. Thus,
based on the parameters of Table 1, we perform a sensi-
tivity analysis with respect to the parameter m with
m 2 f0:15;0:14;0:13;0:12;0:11;
 0:1;0:09;0:08;0:07;0:06;0:05g:
Applying Algorithm 1 (T ¼ 60, DT ¼ 3), Fig. 5 shows
both the optimal switching time tH (without receding
horizon control) compared to the optimal switching time
tHH (with receding horizon control) in dependence of
m (left), and the profit growth with respect to the switching
time for different learning rates (right). Again, the com-
putations are based on a simulation of 120 time units. Here,
we observe that the impact of receding horizon control
decreases for lower learning rates.
Hence, the results infer that especially firms in high-
learning industries, e.g., technology-based industries, ben-
efit most from applying the proposed receding horizon
scheme.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the impact of the contract
period on supplier development. In particular, we showed
that the supply chain partners’ incentives to commit rela-
tionship-specific resources, i.e., to invest in cost-reduction
efforts, critically depend on the length of the contract
period.
Given the fact that long-term contracts entail certain
risks, we proposed a receding horizon control scheme to
mitigate possible contractual hazards. In addition, we
showed that dynamically extending contracts enhance the
supplier development process, because value generation is
facilitated while both the manufacturer and the supplier
gain flexibility due to shorter contract periods. Further-
more, we presented two strategies in order to make the
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proposed receding horizon scheme, cf. Algorithm 1,
applicable even if negotiation costs are taken into account.
Finally, we verified the reliability of the application by
performing Algorithm 1 for an extensive parameter set and
demonstrated that receding horizon control leads to a sig-
nificant profit increase within the supply chain. Moreover,
by means of a sensitivity analysis with respect to the
learning rate, we showed that especially firms in high-
learning industries benefit since supplier development
programmes play a predominant role in order to optimize
the cost structure of the supplier network.
The study is based on a simple model to focus on the
impact of dynamical decision-making in supplier devel-
opment. Clearly, a more elaborated model with less strin-
gent assumptions like, e.g., a linear price distribution,
should be studied in the future. Moreover, the combination
of the proposed dynamic strategy with decentralized
approaches is of great importance and deserved a detailed
analysis, see, e.g., the negotiation-based coordination
mechanism proposed in [36]. Another interesting direction
for future research is to expand our study to a network
perspective, in which the supply chain consists of more
than a single manufacturer and a single supplier, see,
e.g., [13], where two manufacturers are engaged in the
development of a supplier.
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A proof of Lemma 1
In this section, a proof of Lemma 1 about the interplay of
the contract period T and the optimal switching time tH is
given.
Proof Let the monotonic function z : tH 7!1þ xtH be
defined, which maps the switching time tH to the
state xðtHÞ at the switching time tH. Furthermore, note
that z0ðtHÞ ¼ x holds. Then, the switching condition (9)
can be rewritten as
ðT  tHÞzðtHÞm1ða cM  c0zðtHÞmÞ ¼ 2bcSD
mc0
: ð16Þ
Clearly, the left- and the right-hand sides are positive
(m\0). While the right-hand side is independent of both T
and tH, the left-hand side can be interpreted as a function
of the switching time tH for a given contract period T. Let
f : ½0; T  ! R 0 be defined by
f ðtHÞ :¼ ðT  tHÞzðtHÞm1ða cM  c0zðtHÞmÞ:
Then, the term f 0ðtHÞ  zðtHÞm2 is a sum consisting of the
positive summand zðtHÞða cM  c0zðtHÞmÞ and
ðT  tHÞx  ð1 mÞða cM  c0zðtHÞmÞ þ c0mzðtHÞm
 
:
Here, it was used that a cM  c0  r[ 0 holds. Hence,
we investigate the term
ð1 mÞða cM  c0zðtHÞmÞ þ c0mzðtHÞm ð17Þ
in order to determine the sign of the second summand using
that ðT  tHÞx[ 0 holds. To this end, the supply chain
profit p :¼ a cM  c0[ r[ 0 per unit plays a major
role: (17) equals
c0  ð1 mÞp=c0 þ mzðtHÞm
 þ ð1 mÞðc0  c0zðtHÞmÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
because m\0 and tH 0 hold. Positivity of the first sum-
mand is ensued from (10). Hence, (17) is positive and,
thus, f 0 is (strictly) decreasing.
In conclusion, the left-hand side of (16) is strictly
decreasing in tH and strictly increasing in T. As a conse-
quence, using T , T[ T , instead of T, i.e., considering the
optimal control problem on a longer time horizon (contract
period), leads a larger switching time tH in order to ensure
validity of the switching condition (9). h
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